" [t]he real challenge will be to find ways that genuinely respond to the development needs of developing countries. This means avoiding the twin traps of mere lip service and an attitude of tokenism to development issues on one hand, and the misguided assumption on the other that disengagement and minimal commitments are the best recipe for supporting the development process through the WTO." 1 Abstract: There is a stark contrast between the ambitious investment promotion efforts of many least developed countries (LDCs) and their often minimal commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS). At a time of urgent need to address domestic infrastructure and investment gaps, this situation cannot be a positive signal for investors (either domestic or foreign), and may be a missed opportunity to address services aspects of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
-6 -

Failure to attract most desired investments?
According to the 2010 World Investment Report, the current pattern of FDI in LDCs is quite understandable:
Private investment requires a minimum threshold of adequate human capital and sound infrastructure to flourish.... Until countries reach a sufficient level of development, FDI primarily flows to the primary sector (especially mining) -as is the case with LDCs -and far less into manufacturing and infrastructure services that are essential for development.
17
A more optimistic perspective can be found in the research by Elizabeth Asiedu, as noted in a International Trade Centre presentation at the 2010 UNCTAD conference "United Nations LDC IV:
Key Development Challenges Facing the LDCs":
WIDER research supports the hypothesis that natural resources and large markets promote FDI, but rejects 'defeatism' -policy and institutional variables have a similar weight in cross-country panel regressions for 22 African countries of which 13 are LDCs:
• "Main result is that natural resources and large markets promote FDI. However, lower inflation, good infrastructure, educated population, openness to FDI, less corruption, political stability and a reliable legal system have a similar effect."
• Hence: "countries that have small markets or lack natural resources can attract FDI"
18
LDC investment promotion: lacking international credibility?
Multiple references are presented in this working paper to the high level of perceived investment risk for most LDCs (e.g. Box 1), which is reflected in their typically poor ratings across a range of FDI (and other) indexes. 19 With respect to Africa, Paul Collier has emphasized that governments face numerous disadvantages in attracting investment:
The reputation of a government depends partly on the conduct of previous governments of the same country and partly on the conduct of other governments regarded as similar. The speed with which reputations are revised to reflect current behaviour of the government concerned depends on the amount that foreign firms are willing to invest in information. African governments are at an acute disadvantage in all three respects. First, most African countries have been through a phase of poor -7 -governance so the legacy is a poor reputation even if currently unwarranted. Second, because most African countries are small, more weight is likely to be placed on the reputation of the neighbourhood than, say, if firms are making an assessment of China or India. ... Third, because Africa is economically small, less money will be invested in current information, so reputation is likely to react more slowly to improvements in the African environment.
20 {emphasis added} Box 1: "Attracting increased FDI flows to African LDCs" "The Africa Regional Preparatory Meeting underscored the important role that foreign direct investment can play in promoting sustained growth and development through technology diffusion as well as its effect in enhancing efficiency and productivity." "Efforts should be made to channel FDI to support productive capacity development and diversification. Strengthening national, bilateral and multilateral efforts can go a long way in overcoming the constraints limiting African LDCs' attractiveness to foreign investment. Bilateral and multilateral partners can support LDCs in attracting FDI by providing insurance to offset the high perceived political risk of African LDCs. Furthermore, FDI incentives by home countries to match measures taken by African LDCs for attracting inflows and targeting them to priority sectors should be encouraged." {emphasis added} "Given the increasing competition for FDI, African LDCs should continue to improve their attractiveness to foreign investment through a number of fiscal and non-tax incentives. Fiscal incentives should be used as part of a broader policy package. In attracting FDI, African LDCs need to introduce targeted and sector specific investment incentives to facilitate FDI into priority sectors." {emphasis added} -8 -One stage up from an investment code, which should apply to all investment-not just foreign investment, is to extend current investor insurance arrangements from foreign to domestic investors. The global public insurance facility for investors, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), is currently restricted to providing insurance only for foreign investors. This produces the absurd situation that foreign capital is safer than domestic capital, something which may have contributed to African capital flight.
23 {emphasis added} [t]he real challenge will be to find ways that genuinely respond to the development needs of developing countries. This means avoiding the twin traps of mere lip service and an attitude of tokenism to development issues on one hand, and the misguided assumption on the other that disengagement and minimal commitments are the best recipe for supporting the development process through the WTO. Succumbing to either temptation will make the results less meaningful and the WTO less useful to all parties. 38 Mali is no exception, as described in Part IV. The situation is similar to the differences between "bound" and "applied" tariffs for goods.
III. GATS, the Doha Negotiations and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
"
30
Low level of existing GATS commitments
39
Consequently, the gap between GATS commitments and the actual applied services regimewhich is evidently even larger than the gap between bound and applied tariffs -potentially represents a risk factor for both traders and investors, as there is always the possibility that the current level of liberalization and market openness will not be maintained.
40
Of course, the extent to which investment decisions might be affected is directly related to the existing level of investor confidence, together with the expected level of profitability and other factors.
Preserving "policy space"
As illustrated in the Ezulwini Declaration [Box 2], there is need for a careful balance --between maintaining sufficient "policy space" and ensuring a predictable trading environment --which should be decided on a case-by-case basis by the countries themselves. Unfortunately, policy space appears often to be unclearly defined, subject to potential misuse, and in some cases even 35 Cape Verde and the Maldives were LDCs when their lists of GATS commitments were created, and consequently are included in this working paper, but are no longer considered as LDCs by the United Nations. 39 "Bound" tariffs are legally binding WTO obligations that represent a "ceiling rate" which governments have promised not to exceed, and "applied" tariffs are those actually charged at the border and typically considerably lower, but without any legal guarantee of being continued. 40 The actual level of risk can be reduced by coverage under BITs and FTAs, which has the consequence of reducing "policy space", as noted below.
-11 - - -05, February 2009 notes that many BITs are subject to MFN requirements under the GATS and other trade agreements: "The perpetuation of existing levels of access, as far as mode 3 is concerned, is already guaranteed in many countries under investment treaties. ... Since very few Members have listed MFN exemptions for their investment treaties, they are required to extend the benefits involved, including in most cases national treatment on a post-establishment basis, to investors from all WTO Members. GATS commitments thus add an element of credibility to policies that must be implemented on an MFN-basis in any event. "Reaffirming our belief in potential benefits of a non-discriminatory, rules-based multilateral trading system and predictable trading environment, which takes into account the development dimension of international trade and responds to the needs of developing countries, notably those that are particularly vulnerable, ..." {emphasis added} "Underscore the critical role of international trade and investment for development and growth of landlocked developing countries."
"We, nevertheless, recognize the importance of maintaining policy space for LLDC's, allowing them to use commercial and financial measures for purposes of development."
"To recognize the role of foreign direct investment (FDI), which may help accelerate development and reduce poverty through employment, transfer of managerial and technological know-how and non-debt creating flows of capital, as well as its key role in providing infrastructure for transport, telecommunications, and utilities. * General construction work for civil engineering: "only through incorporation in Nepal and with maximum foreign equity capital of 51 per cent. Foreign equity participation will be increased to 80 per cent after 5 years from the date of accession."
We call on capital exporting countries to support efforts made by LLDCs in attracting FDI and to adopt and implement economic, financial and legal incentives to encourage FDI flows to LLDCs." {emphasis added}
Sources:
-15 -By setting an internationally binding minimum level of market access, even partial commitments might help reduce investors' fears of country risks, thereby helping to justify lower profit requirements and improved investment ratings. This could help encourage a wider range of more employment-generating investments, including in infrastructural services. For GATS commitments to be helpful, however, governments presumably will need to publicize them on investment promotion agency websites, and possibly in negotiations with investors.
Depending on the wording, GATS commitments can also offer positive signals to domestic investors, e.g. by specifying a minimum level of total suppliers rather than only of foreign suppliers.
In any case, domestic suppliers in sectors with services commitments almost surely benefit from GATS transparency requirements and other "good governance" provisions, 48 thereby helping to improve the business environment and fight against corruption.
As mentioned above, the phasing-in of GATS commitments, e.g. to be applicable 5 or 10 years in the future, can be a means of ensuring sufficient time to create necessary regulations, and has been frequently used in accession negotiations as well as in the extended WTO telecommunications and financial services negotiations. 49 By making GATS commitments that enter into force within a designated timeframe, governments secure the needed time to develop regulations, while adding motivation to ensure the work is completely promptly and protecting against possible attempts by opposing interest groups to reverse socially beneficial liberalization.
Although LDCs are "not expected" to make GATS commitments -even partial GATS commitments --in the DDA, it arguably may be in their interest to do so. [Box 4] In addition to opportunities for helping to attract FDI and protect policy space, as detailed above, there is also the further positive role that offering to make GATS commitments can play in the DDA, by providing LDCs with additional "bargaining chips" for negotiations. 2 The intention was to allow LDCs to concentrate on "offensive" trade interests, rather than on protecting their "defensive" interests. 3 In the view of the author, however, LDCs instead have unintentionally been left on the sidelines of the GATS negotiations.
In the context of much of the GATS "Request-Offer" negotiating process, including the plurilateral negotiations, LDCs are no longer actively participating, and have ceased to be the "target" of requests for further liberalization. 4 This might be useful from the perspective of reducing pressure from trading partners, but in practice reduces opportunities for LDCs to request something in return, including from other developing countries.
5 LDCs appear to have shifted their focus to technical assistance and other "one-way" developmental measures, such as the proposed LDC waiver, rather than on negotiating new GATS commitments.
Ideally, LDCs could first negotiate on a "commercial" basis, offering to make GATS commitments and receiving offers from trading partners in exchange, then "top up" their negotiations by adding in developmental aspects, including Aid for Trade and the LDC waiver. "Defensive" interests can be protected if LDCs are simply not required to make commitments (para. II). In the author's view, LDCs should instead be placed at the very centre of the DDA negotiations, with their issues the first item on meeting agendas! ******************* Is there a Middle Ground? I.
(Hong Kong Ministerial text) 6 "We recognize the particular economic situation of LDCs, including the difficulties they face, and acknowledge that they are not expected to undertake new commitments." {emphasis added} II.
(WPDR draft) 7 "LDCs shall not be required to apply these disciplines. LDCs are nonetheless encouraged to apply these disciplines, to the extent compatible with their special economic situation and their development, trade and financial needs." {emphasis added} III.
(LDC Modalities) 8 "There shall be flexibility for LDCs for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, and progressively extending market access in line with their development situation. LDCs shall not be expected to offer full national treatment, nor are they expected to undertake additional commitments under Article XVIII of the GATS on regulatory issues which may go beyond their institutional, regulatory, and administrative capacities. In response to requests, LDCs may make commitments compatible with their development, trade and financial needs and which are limited in terms of sectors, modes of supply and scope." {emphasis added} Considering the seriousness of the LDC infrastructure and investment gaps (Annex I), all these alternatives will undoubtedly be required. Nonetheless, GATS commitments appear to have the additional benefit of enabling governments to protect policy space by highlighting trade preferences in a internationally legally binding manner. BITs and FTAs typically follow well-established "templates," rather than emphasize national-level LDC development priorities, and may reflect political compromises among the parties concerned. There is also the issue of power imbalances between LDCs and more developed trading partners, and the effects these might have on the agreements reached.
Perhaps the most difficult issue is determining which combinations of policy options are the most credible, with regard to both domestic and foreign investors. Undoubtedly, the specific balance must be determined on an individual country-by-country basis.
The example of Mali
As shown in Part IV, infrastructure and related services are crucial aspects of Mali's developmental objectives, including achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the same time, both financial and administrative capacity remain limited. Mali is recognized for its social and macroeconomic stability, and has made significant progress in regulatory reform, as highlighted by the World Bank:
-18 - 
Box 5: Mali's Development Priorities in Services
2007-2011 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP) 1
Growth-oriented Infrastructure:
"Growth will be boosted through: (i) the development of viable industrial zones; (ii) the availability of water and electricity at better costs, (iii) the construction of transport infrastructure, and (iv) accessibility to more substantial financing. It is therefore necessary to improve the business climate."
Transport:
"The proposed strategy consists in the promotion of private public transport companies. The role of the Government will be limited to formulating the national transport policy and monitoring its implementation."
Telecommunications/ICT and Posts:
"In light of observation of the telecommunications sector since 1999 and implementation of the laws in force, it would be necessary to improve the legal framework so that private investment and use of private sector skills is encouraged, that the competitiveness of SMEs is improved, and that the objectives of social progress are achieved."
Trade:
"The initiatives taken to promote trade concerned: (i) support for the promotion of exports of some targeted agricultural products, (ii) support for the restructuring of the sector, (iii) improvement of the business climate, ...."
Growth-oriented Sectors:
"In order to ensure better development of the private sector, which is the engine of economic growth, the Government on 12 January 2005 adopted the Private Sector Development Policy Letter (LPDSP) on improving the investment framework and climate, and developing growth-oriented sectors such as mining, handicraft and tourism, and telecommunications. Special emphasis was laid on the development of growth-oriented infrastructures, such as industrial zones and airport facilities, as well as on the development of financial and nonfinancial services for Small and Medium Size Enterprises."
62 GPRSP, as note 54 above, pp. 25, 62. 63 GPRSP, as note 54 above, p. 24.
-21 -Tourism:
"In order to tap its tourism potential, Mali has developed a cultural policy which aims at structuring the cultural heritage, so as to make it the engine of economic and social development." "The attendant measures to support the sector are: (i) strengthening of the institutional mechanism and building the capacities of all the stakeholders, (ii) diversity of supply and development of touristic sites, restaurants and hotels, (iii) better coordination between investment programmes for road and security infrastructure, ...." 
2008-2012 Action
B. Summary Note of the Ten Year 2006-2015 Plan for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Mali
The 2005 -22 -to address the MDGs mentioned in the Summary Note concern energy, water and sanitation, and transportation. Regarding transportation, the Note states:
The Transportation Sector Policy Document in the framework of TSP II 2008-2012, adopted by the Government in April 2007, comes with an investment program that takes into account the following aspects: (i) the current and periodical maintenance of the priority network, (ii) the development and modernization of the road system, (iii) the upgrading of rail infrastructures and the modernization of transportation equipments, (iv) the development of the infrastructures and the modernization of the equipments of the Bamako-Senou international airport and of domestic airports, (v) the dredging of navigable channels and the acquisition of adequate fluvial transportation equipments as well as the construction of river platforms and ports, and (vi) the development of urban roads.
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With regard to costs, the Summary Note states that about US$ 17.7 billion will be required, with energy accounting for 16 per cent, road and transport 9 per cent, and water and sanitation 8 per cent. The Note suggests that 23 per cent of the costs be paid by beneficiaries, 32 per cent by the central government, and 45 per cent by development partners, without mentioning any role for either domestic or foreign investment. 66 Concerns, however, are expressed over financing:
Based on cost estimates for the achievement of MDGs, it appears that the needs require annual fundings equivalent to approximately twice the Government Budget, all fundings included. Henceforth, the most important issues that need to be addressed are raised in the following terms: (i) Can Mali mobilize enough internal resources (both at the level of the Government and that of other actors) and external resource in order to meet the identified needs? (ii) Can the institutional and human capacities help absorb the resources that will be mobilized? And (iii) Will the management of public finances help assure maximum efficiency of the expenses in order to have maximum impact on the beneficiaries and bring the TFPs to get in line with the national budgetary procedures? In addition to physical infrastructure, another chronic problem inhibiting investment in Mali, and many other LDCs, is the lack of financial services. As noted in the Investment Guide, "Despite improvements to the financial system and the increased availability of resources, businesses continue to lament the difficulties of obtaining credit, especially for long-term investment. These difficulties stem from a scarcity of credit, which banks attribute to the predominance of demand deposits over term deposits."
67
C. An Investment Guide to Mali, Opportunities and Conditions
As emphasized in
72
The Investment Guide also observes that "At the international level, Mali is also a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), created to establish legal security for economic activities in order to restore investor confidence and promote trade among The investment code establishes a number of special investment incentives (see Chapter IV, Fiscal incentives).
Prohibitions and restrictions:
There is no area in which foreign investment is forbidden. There is no restriction on equity: foreign investors can own 100% of any company. 
D. Trade Policy Review Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali
The third Trade Policy Review of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali was held in Geneva in October 2010, based on written reports by the three governments and by the WTO Secretariat. The delegation of Mali was headed by H.E. Mr Ahmadou Abdoulaye Diallo, Minister of Industry, Investment and Trade. Speaking on behalf of the three governments, the Minister stated that:
[a]ware of the major role that domestic and foreign private investors can play in the economic growth of our respective countries, our governments have undertaken to accept and, above all, to protect investment, with strict regard for mutual interests and the rules of international cooperation and good governance. ... Improvements have been made in these investment codes and they now include provisions more attractive to promoters and offer greater security for invested capital. This new approach is aimed at placing investment at the heart of our trade policies and promoting activities with a strong potential for creating jobs and adding value. FDI goes primarily to the banking and telecommunications sectors and the extractive industries. In all three countries, this fluctuating level of investment and its concentration in a few economic activities highlights the need to further improve the business environment.
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E. DTIS: Expanding and Diversifying Trade for Growth and Poverty Reduction
The 2004 Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) for Mali states that ""Foreign investment is seen as an essential channel for physical capital accumulation, access to finance, transfer of skills and managerial know-how and access to foreign markets". At the same time, the study also observes that "A major reason for the low level of (non-gold) FDI in Mali relates to one of image and high factor costs".
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Mali's DTIS highlights many of the same infrastructural services elements that can be found in the GPRSP: Some of the major impediments to industry development in Mali include the high cost and weak reliability of key factors of production (i.e., energy, water, telecommunications), weak infrastructure network, low skilled workforce, significant costs associated with setting up a business, weak access to finance, and unfair competition associated with the informal sector. .... the principal constraints confronting the private sector, which includes a weak and inefficient banking system and financial intermediation, weak judicial and taxation system, insufficient dialogue Growth and Poverty Reduction, November 2004, Draft, pp. 40, 45 (available online, at http://www. enhancedif.org/documents/DTIS%20english%20documents/english/Mali_dtis_17nov04.pdf). For back-ground information on the Enhanced Integrated Framework and the DTIS reports, see http:// www.enhancedif.org/.
-26 -between the private and public sector, insufficient or poorly equipped industrial zones, inadequate provision of energy, transport and telecommunication services, poor infrastructure and infrequent maintenance of roads, and the low education and skill levels of the workforce.
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Mali's DTIS (pp. vii-xvii) includes an Action Matrix, with many references to infrastructure and services, together with the responsible agencies and timelines for completion of the recommended actions. While many of the Action Matrix recommendations have been incorporated into the GPRSP and other policy documents, it is unfortunately difficult to track the implementation progress, as the Action Matrix has evidently not been updated. -27 -evident with the increase in externalities inherent in the 'transnational' nature of the challenges", the report is intended to be a Regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for West Africa (RPRSP-WA).
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Concerning services, the RPRSP-WA observes that "More than 50% of the people in the region live on less than one dollar a day. At the same time, countries in the subregion also lag far behind in other dimensions of human development, in particular, education, health, access to drinking water and other basic infrastructure services such as transportation, energy and telecommunications."
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With respect to infrastructure, the RPRSP-WA also notes that "Studies on competitiveness in the economies of the subregion have shown that half of the production costs stem from infrastructure services. This confirms the major impact that infrastructure development will have on the Union's competitiveness". In this regard, the RPRSP-WA further observes that the role of the State in the region has changed significantly:
the scope of State intervention has gradually dwindled down to three main activities, namely: (i) the organization of partnerships with the private sector to secure the investments needed for the expansion of some services (often by creating a trust company and a management structure, for water, energy, roads, etc.); (ii) market regulation (port, airport, road, telecommunication, energy and other services) and (iii) the extension of services and facilitation of access in case of "incomplete markets", for example the rural areas (rural telephony, rural electrification, rural feeder roads, etc.).
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Part III of the RPRSP is titled "Implementation, Programming, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation", and recommends preparation of a three-year action program (with a corresponding expenditure schedule) and the setting up of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 86 The purpose of this paper is to use a specific national-level example, in this case Mali, to illustrate the contrast between the investment promotion efforts of most LDCs and their typically low level of GATS commitments. Of course, there is no intention to direct the policy-making processes of Mali or any other LDC (in any case, responses to the issues raised in this working paper would presumably be on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with national and regional policy objectives).
In this regard, some general conclusions can apparently be drawn:
Aid alone is not enough?
Mali's MDG report, and more generally Africa's Infrastructure and the UNCTAD 2010 LDC report --see Part IV and Annex I of this working paper --highlight the fact that achieving the ambitious infrastructure (and development) objectives of most LDCs will require major increases in investment spending, at a time of extremely strong budgetary pressures on many development partners. Consequently, creative new financing mechanisms will be required, as noted by UNCTAD and others, including more public-private partnerships. Increases in both domestic investment and FDI will presumably be necessary, to help free more government resources for non-commercial, socially important investments.
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A related aspect is the issue of reducing aid dependence, which is an important objective for most LDCs. To the extent that commercially viable private-sector infrastructure projects can be encouraged, aid dependence might potentially be reduced in the future. In addition, the availability of sufficient commercial funding on competitive terms appears to be a crucial element in ensuring successful graduation from LDC status.
88 UNCTAD LDC Report 2010, as note 9 above, p. 87. 89 Paul Collier, as note 20 above, p. i136. 90 While governments, multilateral financing institutions and development partners will undoubtedly remain the main source of most LDC infrastructure investment, increased private sector involvement could help in maximizing efficiency and enhancing technical expertise, with opportunities for technology transfer.
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Protecting "policy space" versus reducing investment risks
As stated in the Introduction to this paper, the most likely reason for the current low level of GATS commitments by LDCs is a perceived need to preserve "policy space", reflecting a fear that WTO commitments are too "strong" or inflexible. Ironically, the pattern of existing GATS commitments actually shows great flexibility, including with regard to regulatory issues, and is proof that LDCs typically are not forced to liberalize any particular services sector. 91 Arguably, an important part of protecting policy space is publicizing policy priorities, and making them known internationally. The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism, especially the government report, is an important opportunity to do so. 92 Making GATS commitments -including partial commitments --as described in Part III of this paper, in contrast to bilateral investment treaties or free trade agreements, might actually help protect policy space, by making national priorities legally binding internationally. To the extent that LDCs can point to increased GATS commitments as a more solid "foundation" for investor protection, there are grounds for requesting reduction of the "risk premium" so often demanded for LDC investments, as well as for encouraging a wider range of FDI, including more infrastructural and socially beneficial investments.
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"Expect the unexpected"?
As observed above, no single option is evidently sufficient to address the LDC infrastructure and investment gaps, and more holistic approaches are required. Although GATS commitments are apparently neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for increasing FDI, it is difficult to see how they could fail to be helpful, especially when used to help improve the overall consistency and credibility of LDC trade policies. In addition, they give LDCs some additional "bargaining chips" in the current DDA negotiations.
As noted in Part III of this paper, LDCs are "not expected" to make GATS commitments in the current DDA negotiations. 94 Of course, any willingness by LDCs to make GATS commitments, 91 A partial exception, as indicated in Part IV, would be the pattern of commitments taken by accession countries, including Cambodia and Nepal. Nonetheless, as show in Box 3, considerable flexibility is possible despite the intense pressures of the accession process. 92 The EIF Action Plans would also seem highly useful for this purpose (Mali's is available online, at http://www.enhancedif.org/documents/DTIS%20english%20documents/english/Mali_ActionMatrix_en.pdf); unfortunately, they are usually not updated. 93 As mentioned in Part II, other possible mechanisms to improve the international investment reputation of LDCs would presumably include higher rankings in the World Bank's Doing Business index, as recently demonstrated by Rwanda --which received extensive publicity as the leading reformer for 2010. 94 Perhaps it's a question of semantics but, as explained in Part III, in the author's view the negotiating position of LDCs would be considerably enhanced if the interpretation was instead that LDCs are "not required" to make GATS commitments, leaving open the possibility that they could be persuaded to make further commitments -including partial commitments -if offered sufficient incentives in return by trading partners.
-30 -including partial commitments, will be strongly welcomed, and could have positive effects on attracting FDI. In addition, offers by LDCs to accept commitments beyond their WTO obligationsespecially if made as a group -might even bring added impetus to such LDC negotiating priorities as the movement of natural persons (GATS Mode 4), the LDC waiver for services, and reductions in agricultural subsidies.
____________________ -31 -
ANNEX I: LDC Infrastructure and Investment Gaps
A. Blocked structural transition?
The UNCTAD 2010 LDC report, Towards a New International Development Architecture for LDCs, emphasizes that growth (and investment) in LDC manufacturing and services has been grossly insufficient. Instead, recent growth has occurred primarily in natural resource-related sectors characterized by low employment creation, a situation termed as a "blocked structural transition":
The overall and ongoing pattern of structural change in the LDCs can be described as a "blocked structural transition". More and more people are seeking work outside agriculture, but the pattern of structural change in output means that they cannot find productive and decent work. In 2008, own account and contributing family workers, mainly engaged in informal economic activities, represented about 80 per cent of the workforce in the LDCs.... Precisely because the boom reinforced the existing specialization in (mostly non-agricultural) primary commodities, instead of spurring the expansion of labour-intensive manufactures and services, economic growth failed to translate into broad-based employment creation.
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The UNCTAD 2010 LDC report further notes the linkages between structural change, employment, and poverty alleviation:
The employment challenge, which is the key to substantial poverty reduction, is closely related to the pattern of structural change. The LDCs generally have very high population growth rates, and consequently the number of young people entering the labour market is increasing each year. Agriculture typically employs a large share of the labor force in LDCs, but agricultural productivity remains very low and the majority of farms are small, with the result that living standards for most peasants tend to be at or near subsistence levels. The sector is also less able now to absorb labour owing to decreasing farm sizes and lack of investment, including poor soil management.
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B. LDC "Infrastructure Gap"
The importance of adequate infrastructure cannot be overestimated. 
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The relationship between infrastructure availability, economic growth and improved productivity is emphasized in the report by César Calderón, Infrastructure and Growth in Africa, which states:
The findings show that growth is positively affected by the volume of infrastructure stocks and the quality of infrastructure services; simulations show that our empirical findings are significant statistically and economically. Identifying areas of opportunity to generate productivity growth, the authors find that African countries 
